German police attempting to rescue the Israeli hostages
Responsiblities
The International Olympic Committee had the responsibility to ensure the athletes staying in the Olympic Village were safe. Once the Israelis were taken hostage, Germany, the hosting country, had the responsibility to secure their release. The rights of the Israeli and other athletes were violated when they were not adequately protected. The responsibility for their protection fell on both the IOC and the hosting country, both who failed to fulfill this mandate.
According to the Kopel Report, a top-secret Israeli government document that was made public in 2004, members of the Israeli Olympic delegation sent to Munich in 1972 were concerned about the obvious lack of security at the athletes’ living quarters. They especially noticed that ground-floor accommodations were dangerous and the close proximity of the Israel dorms to the Sudanese team’s dorms. They also noticed Palestinian workers employed throughout the Olympic Village. But the Israeli delegation convinced themselves that although they did not see many armed security guards, they believed that the security officers were difficult to spot because they were working undercover. The German government also did not want to seem overly armed just 27 years after World War II. However, once the Palestinian terrorist group attacked, the efforts to save them were ineffectual and the German incompetence during the hostage crisis was absolute. A quote given to the head of the Israeli Olympic delegation, Shmuel Lalkin, by security personnel was, “As manager of the Israeli Olympic team it would be advisable for you to concentrate on sports”. Germany, advertised the Munich Olympics as relaxed, fun-loving, and carefree. Safety measures were lax, policemen not armed, and Germany spent less than $1 million for security. This lack of preparation and vigilance is what led to catastrophic events.
According to the Kopel Report, a top-secret Israeli government document that was made public in 2004, members of the Israeli Olympic delegation sent to Munich in 1972 were concerned about the obvious lack of security at the athletes’ living quarters. They especially noticed that ground-floor accommodations were dangerous and the close proximity of the Israel dorms to the Sudanese team’s dorms. They also noticed Palestinian workers employed throughout the Olympic Village. But the Israeli delegation convinced themselves that although they did not see many armed security guards, they believed that the security officers were difficult to spot because they were working undercover. The German government also did not want to seem overly armed just 27 years after World War II. However, once the Palestinian terrorist group attacked, the efforts to save them were ineffectual and the German incompetence during the hostage crisis was absolute. A quote given to the head of the Israeli Olympic delegation, Shmuel Lalkin, by security personnel was, “As manager of the Israeli Olympic team it would be advisable for you to concentrate on sports”. Germany, advertised the Munich Olympics as relaxed, fun-loving, and carefree. Safety measures were lax, policemen not armed, and Germany spent less than $1 million for security. This lack of preparation and vigilance is what led to catastrophic events.